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The teaching case describes India’s telecommunications market as it went through a major transformation due to its
adopting mobile telephony. The country’s huge market size and low teledensity have provided an attractive
opportunity for foreign multinationals. Telenor entered the Indian market through a joint venture with Unitech Wireless
under the brand name of Uninor and targeted the value-conscious segment of mobile customers with its attractive
pricing schemes. After a few years of rapid growth, Uninor faced a huge business risk when the Supreme Court of
India ruled that its purchased spectrum was illegal. The case describes the aftermath of the 2G spectrum scam and
how it adversely affected Uninor’s future. At this critical juncture, Telenor faced a strategic decision dilemma. Should it
continue its operations in the ever-growing Indian mobile market or should it cut its losses and exit before receiving
further damage to its global brand? This teaching case imparts important lessons about doing telecommunications-
related business in an emerging economy with high returns and immense business risks. 
Keywords: Emerging Economy, Joint Venture, Spectrum Scam, Strategic Decision, Telecommunications Industry,
Telenor. 
 
Editor’s note: a teaching note for this case can be obtained from bose@iimcal.ac.in. 
This manuscript underwent editorial review. It was received 10/03/2016 and was with the authors for 6 months for 3 revisions. Heikki 
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1 The Indian Telecommunications Industry 
After 2009, India’s telecommunications industry experienced exponential growth in its subscriber base 
after the government decided to expand mobile telephony by selling wireless spectrum to more 
companies. In doing so, it increased the number of telecom players in the Indian mobile market. As of 
2011, India was the second largest and the fastest-growing mobile market in the world with around 
400,000 telecom towers in the country (Holton & Abboud, 2012). Figure 1 shows the growth in number of 
wireless subscribers in India from 2006 to 2011. In 2011, telephony services had about 846 million 
subscribers and wireless telephony subscribers had around 811 million. Among these subscribers, nearly 
698 million subscribers used the popular GSM technology, and about 113 million subscribers used the 
CDMA technology. The country boasted a huge population of nearly 1.2 billion. Its teledensity (including 
both wireline and wireless services) was nearly 70 percent, and there was a huge opportunity for growth in 
the penetration rate for telecommunications services (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 2011). As a 
result, foreign firms sought to operate in India. However, one driver that made the market challenging was 
the country’s extremely low calling rates, which were substantially lower than those of other countries. 
However, these rates were necessary to cater to India’s low-income population. Moreover, any new player 
would have to offer rates that were lower than the ones already offered to customers in order to 
successfully capture market share. 
Further, urban areas had much higher connectivity than rural ones. By March 2011, urban teledensity had 
reached about 157 percent, but the rural teledensity was only around 34 percent (Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India, 2011). The stark difference in teledensity clearly indicated the need for a further drop in 
prices to make mobile telephony a viable option for a large section of the Indian population that resided in 
its rural areas. The Indian market had room for more telecommunications service providers, especially 
those who were willing to hit the rock bottom with their prices. Such offerings from companies would be 
attractive for the rural population that was eager to adopt mobile telephony and use it mostly for voice 
calls. Interestingly, the wireless subscriber growth rate in rural areas was nearly 41 percent as opposed to 
about 34 percent in the urban areas, and the number of wireless subscribers who resided in the rural 
region was nearly 273 million (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 2011). Thus, while the country had 
seen rapid growth in its wireless segment, it saw only modest growth in its wired segment.  
Table 1 provides a historical timeline of major events that have shaped the Indian telecom market. 








March	06 March	07 March	08 March	09 March	10 March	11
Wireless	Subscribers	(in	millions)
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1992 Private telecom players can provide value-added services (i.e., all services beyond normal voice calls).
1994 
National telecom policy is formalized to ensure world standard telecommunications services on 
demand for all residents of the country. 
1997 
An independent regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), is established to oversee 
policy making. 
1999 
The Department of Telecommunication (DoT) established a state-owned telecommunications company 
named Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL). 
2002 International long distance (ILD) services are opened to competition and license fees are reduced. 
2003 
Unified access licensing regime is established to allow operators to procure licenses and provide 
wireline and wireless voice and non-voice services in their operation area(s). 
2004 
Broadband policy is established to accelerate development of telecommunications infrastructure to 
ensure a minimum download speed of 256 kilobits per second (kbps). 
2005 Limit of foreign domestic investment (FDI) is increased to 74 percent. 
2006 Portability of mobile numbers is proposed. 
2008 3G policy is announced along with third party auctions for allocating spectrum. 
2009 
Central Vigilance Commission directed Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate irregularities 
in 2G spectrum allocation. 
2010 
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) submitted report on 2G spectrum allocation to Indian 
Government that stated a major loss due to irregularities in the execution of the spectrum auctions. 
 
Table 2. Registered Connections by Operator (Adapted from GSMA Intelligence, 2011) 
Operator Registered connections (millions) 
Airtel 169.2 
Reliance Communications 143.3 
Vodafone 141.5 
Idea Cellular 95.1 
BSNL 91.8 
Tata Teleservices 91 
Aircel 58 
Uninor 26.3 
MTS (Mobile TeleSystems) 11.7 
Videocon Mobile 7.1 
As Table 3 shows, three big players dominated the Indian market: Airtel, Reliance Communications, and 
Vodafone.  These three players together enjoyed nearly half of the market share in India and focused on 
the upper echelon of society. The state-owned BSNL and its sister company MTNL owned a small part of 
the market share. 
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In 2009, the country witnessed innovative pricing models that firms used to lure the value-conscious 
customers. Tata Teleservices introduced per-second billing for mobile telephony, which pressurized 
market leaders such as Airtel, Reliance Communications, and Vodafone to follow suit. With the innovative 
model that Tata Teleservices offered and the support of mobile number portability, a large number of 
subscribers migrated from their parent network to the company that provided the “best and cheapest 
deal”. This migration indicated the change coming about in the Indian telecom sector, which was now 
poised to become a fiercely competitive market with a rapidly changing subscriber base. At this time, 
Telenor entered the market. 
2 Uninor: The Company 
Telenor Group, a mobile operator, was one of the top 500 global companies by market value in the world. 
It offered services in the Nordic region (i.e., Norway, Sweden and Denmark), in Central and Eastern 
Europe (i.e., Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro), and in Asia (i.e., Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan). Based on its success in several Asian countries, Telenor was keen to establish its presence in 
India. The company believed that its operations in India would result in similar benefits as its operations 
across Asia had done so far. Telenor aimed to gain an eight percent share of the Indian mobile market by 
2018 (TelecomTiger, 2009). 
To enter India, Telenor joined forces with the Unitech group, a real estate company that had already 
launched a firm named Unitech Wireless in 2007. India was divided into 22 “circles” or service areas for 
telecommunications services, which roughly followed India’s state lines. Unitech Wireless had 2G 
spectrum licenses for all those circles across the country (Merchant, 2010). Telenor bought into Unitech 
Wireless because it did not want to enter the Indian market independently. Telenor agreed to obtain a 
controlling stake in Unitech Wireless subject to regulatory approval. With the licenses, Telenor could use 
its telecom experience and expertise to capture market share. Telenor planned to combine its successful 
experience in mobile operations in Asia with Unitech’s presence as a trusted corporation in the Indian 
market. Telenor was to inject equity into Unitech Wireless in four installments by early 2009. Telenor 
expected to break even on the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) in 
three years and produce positive operational cash flow in five years (TelecomTiger, 2009). The 
partnership was a symbiotic one since Unitech Wireless now had Telenor, a global leader in telecom 
services, handling its operations. 
Unitech Wireless also entered into tower-sharing agreements with Quippo Telecom Infrastructure and 
Wireless TT Info Service, which allowed Unitech Wireless to mount its mobile antennas on these 
companies’ existing towers. It opted for this strategy to swiftly rollout its mobile services with a low 
overhead. When the agreement closed, Telenor held four out of the seven seats on the Unitech Wireless 
Board of Directors. Stein-Erik Vellan was nominated as the first managing director of Unitech Wireless. 
Vellan was previously CEO of Telenor Serbia. Telenor announced that its mobile operations in India would 
be called Uninor. With the Indian telecom authority’s approving Unitech Wireless’s application to increase 
the number of shares foreign companies could own in Indian companies to 74 percent, Telenor began 
increasing its stake. 
Analysts had been cool towards the company. India was a market of fast growth but offered very small 
margins that made it difficult to allow a new company such as Telenor to turn to profit quickly. Telenor 
focused on reaching out to the low-income segment of the Indian population with its low pricing-based 
model. Uninor launched mobile services in India on 3 December, 2009, and became the 12th operator in 
the Indian market. On the first day of services, Uninor covered a footprint of almost 600 million people in 
seven telecom circles: Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh East, Uttar 
Pradesh West, and Bihar (Telenor, 2009). The 2G network was sufficient to host basic telephony 
operations such as voice calls, SMS, and basic 2G Internet browsing. Uninor offered mobile telephony 
data services based on the GSM technology on a 4.4 MHz spectrum. 
With the tagline “Ab mera number hai” (i.e., “My time is now”), Uninor targeted the younger and cost-
conscious segment of the country. From the launch day, Uninor was available at over 210,000 points of 
sale through almost 1000 exclusive distributors (Telenor, 2009). Figure 2 shows the growth in the number 
of subscribers and market share for Uninor. 
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Figure 2. Growth of Subscribers and Market Share for Uninor (Adapted from Wikimedia, 2011b)
Uninor next launched services in five more circles in India: Mumbai, Maharashtra and Goa, Gujarat, 
Kolkata, and West Bengal. Table 3 shows Uninor’s market share in 2011 and its rank among telecom 
service providers in different operating circles.  
Table 3. Market Share and Rank of Uninor in its Operating Circles (Adapted from 
Wikimedia, 2011a) 
Circle (in alphabetical order) Market Share (%) Rank 
Andhra Pradesh 4.0 7 
Bihar 5.2 8 
Gujarat 4.2 7 
Karnataka 2.3 9 
Kerala 2.0 9 
Kolkata 5.8 7 
Maharashtra 3.5 7 
Mumbai 3.1 9 
Orissa 4.5 8 
Tamil Nadu 1.8 9 
UP East 6.2 7 
UP West 6.4 7 
West Bengal 5.7 7 
3 The 2G Spectrum Scam 
In 2007, the Indian telecom sector had a huge customer base for mobile telephony that a handful of 
operators captured. There were nearly 234 million users and only seven mobile operators to serve them. 
Telecom Minister A. Raja planned to bring in new players. Since he planned to distribute new licenses in 
2008, it was expected that the cost of procurement of these licenses would also increase. However, Raja 
did not introduce a revised price for the license to avoid new telecom companies from having to pay more 
money to procure them. Also, Raja arbitrarily changed the cutoff dates under the first-come, first-served 
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telecom market on the old first-come, first-served basis and also on the old price of licenses. The 
Government of India gave out 122 licenses to these nine new players along with 38 dual technology 
licenses bundled with the 4.4 MHz spectrum at an undervalued price. The licenses’ arbitrarily low price 
and the manipulation of the cutoff dates came to be known as the “2G spectrum scam”. 
The scam and, thereafter, the losses that the national treasury faced came to the spotlight. The CAG 
estimated the loss to the national treasury to be more than US$40 billion. This amount totaled the 1999 
canceled spectrum payments, spectrum giveaways from 2001-08, and spectrum underselling in 2008. The 
CAG estimated that the losses due to irregularities in handling spectrum payments from the 2001-2008 
period totaled around US$0.25 billion, and so, although “the current undervaluation and misallocation of 
spectrum is part of an earlier series of scandals, the sheer size, scale and scope of the scam is 
unprecedented” (Thakurta & Kaushal, 2010). However, other controversies related to the calculation of the 
amount of money that the national treasury lost arose, and some estimated the loss to be much lower 
than what the CAG had estimated (Nairita, 2011). The CAG report blamed the DoT for not doing proper 
due diligence in examining and scrutinizing the applicants. The CAG claimed that this lack of due 
diligence led to ineligible applicants’ procuring licenses. 
3.1 Uninor and the 2G Spectrum Scam 
The auditor reported that the DoT allocated spectrum to Unitech, which had no prior experience in the 
sector at the time, at a throwaway price. The auditor based this allegation on the fact that the company 
had procured the licenses before Telenor came into the picture and could not boast of relevant telecom 
experience. Telenor investigated the way the DoT awarded the licenses and denied that Uninor had 
procured the mobile phone licenses in an irregular manner. 
On 4 February, 2011, the CBI took Telecom Minister Raja into judicial custody. The CBI informed the 
court that Raja had favorites among the new players: Swan Telecom and Unitech Wireless. The media 
reported that Unitech had paid US$365 million as a license fee but had sold a 60 percent stake to Telenor 
for US$ 1.36 billion, which took its valuation to US$2.27 billion without a single subscriber on board 
(Thakurta, 2011). The CBI claimed that Swam Telecom and Unitech Wireless together caused a loss of 
nearly US$1.6 billion to the national treasury because they had offloaded shares of their companies for 
huge amounts to foreign investors. 
3.2 Telenor’s Reaction 
A major tussle began between Telenor and Unitech. Telenor wanted to launch a rights issue (i.e., an issue 
of shares offered at a special price by a company to its existing shareholders in proportion to their holding 
of old shares) to meet Uninor’s funding requirements and to support future investments. On the other 
hand, Unitech procured a stay order that prevented Telenor’s actions because it believed they were not in 
the best interests of Uninor. With the scam having hit the country, banks were not ready to offer loans to 
the telecom companies and prevented them from paying the vendors for the infrastructure they used. With 
clearance from court, Telenor initiated a US$1.65 billion rights issue on 26 September, 2011, despite 
opposition from Unitech on the grounds that the rights issue would violate the cap on FDI (Dasgupta, 
2012). Telenor had not planned to change Uninor’s ownership structure, and so both owners needed to 
subscribe to the rights issue. Unitech filed a petition before the Company Law Board in India and blamed 
Telenor and its executives for mismanaging the joint venture Uninor. In the middle of the ongoing chaos, 
Telenor asked Sanjay Chandra, Group Managing Director of the Unitech Group and in judicial custody for 
being linked to the 2G scam, to step down from the Board of Unitech until the 2G spectrum scam trial 
finished. However, Unitech backed Sanjay Chandra. 
The hostility between Telenor and Unitech further heightened when Unitech offered to buy Telenor’s stake 
in Uninor. After Telenor’s investment in 2009, the value of Uninor had reached nearly US$2.27 billion. Yet, 
Telenor valued the company at US$1 billion, excluding debt, on 4 October, 2011. Unitech blamed the 
alleged depreciation from US$2.27 billion to US$ 1 billion on Telenor (Economic Times Bureau, 2011).  
4 The Aftermath and the Dilemma 
On 2 February, 2012, the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on a public interest petition that 
sought to cancel 122 cellular phone licenses that the Indian Government granted in 2008, which included 
the 22 licenses that Uninor held. Table 4 shows the details related to the 122 canceled licenses. This 
quashing was effective from four months after the date of issue. The order crippled Uninor’s licenses and, 
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hence, its ability to offer telecom services from 2 June, 2012. The move hurt all the new entrants to the 
Indian market and allowed the established players who had licenses prior to 2008 to raise telephony 
prices. 




Uninor (Unitech-Telenor) 22 36.31 
MTS (Sistema-Shyam) 21 15 
Loop Telecom (formerly BPL Mobile) 21 3.24 
Videocon Mobile 21 5.44 
Etisalat DB (formerly Swan) 15 1.67 
S-Tel (Bahrain Telecom) 6 3.55 
Idea Cellular 9 6 
Spice Communications (Merged with Idea) 4 Non-operational 
Tata Teleservices 3 3.1 
*The 122 canceled licenses involved nine operators and 22 telecom circles. 
Telenor’s Indian operations took the worst hit from the canceled licenses. Telenor was one of the most 
aggressive among the new entrants. Telenor had executed a lawful investment and was looking for an 
outcome that would not jeopardize its investment. With the fluid situation, the permanent solution seemed 
to be either to leave the market or re-bid for spectrum. However, with the cancellation order for the 
licenses, the Indian Government had not specified the timing or the terms of the re-auction. The Supreme 
Court’s cancellation of the licenses sparked a diplomatic drive to secure the state-owned Telenor’s 
investment in India. The Norwegian Government intervened with Indian authorities to try and save 
Telenor. Rigmor Aasrud, the Norwegian IT Minister, said: “Telenor has done nothing wrong in India. That 
is, as I understand, that the court has made a decision about how the government handled the licenses.” 
(India Today, 2012a). 
On 15 February, 2012, the Telenor Group issued a notice to Unitech that it would seek indemnity and also 
compensation following the Supreme Court order, which canceled all of Uninor’s 22 licenses. Telenor’s 
stand was that it lacked guilt and had adhered to all the agreements and rules of the government. Telenor 
held Unitech liable for the breach of warranties and sought compensation for all the investment, 
guarantees, and damages that the court’s decision caused. As a precaution, Telenor planned to write 
down its remaining fixed and intangible assets in India, which it would include in its Q1, 2012 results 
(Sidartha, 2012). 
Meanwhile, Telenor considered the possibility of quitting its India operations if things did not improve 
(Firstpost, 2012). Telenor’s CEO Jon Fredrik Baksaas remarked: 
The ruling is a very serious attack on our investments, based on the license framework that was 
spelt out in 2008. We met every inch of that regulation of that license. We have brought 
competition to the Indian market…just to see a ruling that has significant retroactive 
consequences. It is an action that we have never seen in any country before. (India Today, 
2012b) 
At the same time, there were rumors that Telenor might form a new company altogether and strengthen 
its presence in India. Analysts speculated that the partnership with Unitech did not have a future. 
Therefore, Telenor should look for a new Indian partner and separate its Indian mobile venture Uninor 
from its previous partner Unitech. The new company would then serve as a platform to approach the new 
revised auctions for the fresh licenses as the Supreme Court decided. Sigve Brekke mentioned in a press 
briefing: 
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We did not come to India to give up, but to win. And, that's what we are going to do. Looking at 
the way our employees, our trade partners and our customers have responded over the past 
few days, I am confident we will succeed. (PTI, 2012) 
By that time, Unitech announced that it would quit the telecom business and focus on its core business 
area (i.e., real estate) and made it clear that the company would not bid for new licenses when the auction 
occurred. It made this decision despite the fact that Uninor saw the second highest net new subscriber 
additions after Idea Cellular. In fact, Uninor saw an almost 27 percent increase in new customers in 
February, 2012 (Rediff.com, 2012). 
Some believed that the licenses’ cancellation had put Telenor face-to-face with a major decision point. 
Naysayers reasoned that the time was the best one for Telenor to find its way out of the country and its 
investment and, thereby, prevent further losses. But others pointed out the upside of the mobile business 
in India and the fact that Uninor had done reasonably well with its bottom-of-the-pyramid pricing strategy. 
Perhaps it was time for Telenor to seek out a new partner or go alone. However, the new auctioning 
process was unclear, and it was widely speculated that the companies would have to spend a fortune to 
procure the licenses they had lost. Some said that the prices could be ten times the price of the previously 
acquired licenses (CIOL Bureau, 2012). Finally, it was not clear when the auctioning was going to occur. 
In case of a major delay, a large number of existing Uninor customers could very easily migrate to a 
different service provider that used mobile number portability. What should Telenor have done at this 
critical juncture of its life in India? 
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